PQC is Not a New Problem, But It Could be a Now Problem

Technology experts have warned for more than a decade that quantum computers could eventually break modern public-key encryption. But industry and military leaders at the TechNet Indo-Pacific conference Wednesday cautioned that advances in quantum computing and superintelligence could bring that threat closer to reality than ever before.

Citing a September 2026 research paper from quantum company IonQ, Chris Dorny, the company’s federal platform director, said the company’s current forecast has a quantum computer achieving 20,000 quantum bits, or qubits, between 2028 and 2029, giving it potentially enough computational power to crack RSA-2048 encryption in 26 days.

“Those are the types of things we need to prepare for and make sure that we’ve got in line of … the areas that we need to focus on in each one of our networks to make sure that we maintain that security and agility,” he said.

Predicting Q-Day has long been a moving target, with estimates ranging from years to decades. Panelists Wednesday warned that rapid advances in superintelligence algorithms could accelerate that timeline, heightening concerns that near-peer adversaries such as Russia and China could develop quantum capabilities capable of breaking modern encryption sooner than anticipated.

“I think on one side we have accelerated quantum computing. On the other side, we’re being more efficient, effective with algorithm development,” said Matthew McFadden, General Dynamics Information Technology vice president of cyber and division CISO. “I don’t think our adversaries are going to say, ‘Hey, yeah, we did it.’ I think that if anything, it’s raising awareness that the time to drive to post-quantum cryptography is now.”

Harvest and Decrypt

While the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has spent the past decade evaluating and standardizing algorithms that can now provide quantum-resistant encryption, another concern is the adversarial practice of collecting U.S. data encrypted under current algorithms that can be broken on Q-Day, a practice known as harvest now, decrypt later.

Because of this, the challenge of shifting to PQC is not merely the technological lift of securing today’s secrets, but also the past classified intelligence.

“We just take a basic look at Secret [classification] would be x number of years, Top Secret would be y number of years. Those years could range into the two decades to five decades. So if you’re collecting information and we want to hold it at that classification level for 50 years, and you’re able to harvest something within the past 50 years and then be able to decrypt it, that’s significant to an operational perspective,” said Capt. Victor Taylor, U.S. Pacific Fleet communications and information systems director for the N6 Directorate.

Maj. Gen. Garrett Yee, former assistant to the DISA Director and current GDIT vice president of DOD customer relations, said it is likely too late to protect that data, but also stressed that military officials have to be aware of the technology they are procuring now.

“Anyone who bought year-end equipment this past month, hardware companies are now including PQC-compliant capabilities today. So you buy a lot of the common-name endpoint laptops, etc., many of them are PQC-compliant. Not all of them, though,” he said. “If it was, good on you because that hardware is good for like three to five years potentially. But if it wasn’t PQC-compliant, then the guidance from the DOW CIO will tell you that in two or three years you have to change it again.”

Challenges and Solutions

The threat of Q-Day looms as the Joint Force is already experiencing a large technological shift to SI, ongoing modernization efforts, edge connectivity challenges and the combination of technical debt and limited budgets.

However, the panelists said the awareness that ensuring any future procurement is PQC-compliant is a good first step, along with a top-down communication of the problem’s urgency.

“The thoughts that I’ve had are about operational integration and our security operations centers and making our airmen quantum-aware,” said Col. Tassi Davis, Pacific Air Forces director of cyber ops and warfighter comms. “It’s not just about us understanding the threat. It’s not just about our leaders understanding the threat, but we really need all of our airmen, soldiers, sailors, Marines, Coast Guard, all of everyone to understand what that threat is, or at least have a basic understanding of what quantum threats are, and then work those processes into our operational centers.”